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Posted by: thepinetree on 06/04/2018 09:02 AM Updated by: thepinetree on 06/04/2018 09:02 AM
Expires: 01/01/2023 12:00 AM

Supreme Court Rules for Masterpiece Cakeshop. Justice Kennedy Delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Washington, DC...In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’s owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did not recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.

The Commission determined that the shop’s actions violated the Act and ruled in the couple’s favor. The Colorado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement order, and this Court now must decide whether the Commission’s order violated the Constitution.

The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.

One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a difference.

The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free exercise claim. A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless.

Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality. The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not doso with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.

Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that whatever the outcome of some future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The shop offers a variety of baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies to elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday parties, weddings, and other events.

Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and operated the shop for 24 years. Phillips is a devout Christian. He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be obedient to” Jesus Christ and Christ’s “teachings in all aspects of his life.” App. 148. And he seeks to “honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.” Ibid. One of Phillips’ religious beliefs is that “God’s intention for marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.” Id., at 149. To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.

Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they entered his shop in the summer of 2012. Craig and Mullins were planning to marry. At that time, Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver. To prepare for their celebration, Craig and Mullins visited the shop and told Phillips that they were interested in ordering a cake for “our wedding.” Id., at 152 (emphasis de-leted). They did not mention the design of the cake they envisioned.

Phillips informed the couple that he does not “create” wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. Ibid. He explained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same sex weddings.” Ibid. The couple left the shop without further discussion.

The following day, Craig’s mother, who had accompanied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why he had declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages. Id., at 153. He later explained his belief that “to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).


For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation. In 1885, less than a decade after Colorado achieved statehood, the General Assembly passed “An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil Rights,” which guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment” of certain public facilities to “all citizens,” “regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133. A decade later, the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply to “all other places of public accommodation.” 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139.

Today, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation. Amended in 2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as other protected characteristics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows:

“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a) (2017).

The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include any “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public,” but excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.” §24–34–601(1).

CADA establishes an administrative system for the resolution of discrimination claims. Complaints of discrimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division. The Division investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause that CADA has been violated, it will refer the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission, in turn, decides whether to initiate a formal hearing before a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who will hear evidence and argument before issuing a written decision. See §§24–34–306, 24–4–105(14). The decision of the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-member appointed body. The Commission holds a public hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case. If the Commission determines that the evidence proves a CADA violation, it may impose remedial measures as provided by statute. See §24–34–306(9). Available remedies include, among other things, orders to cease-and-desist a discriminatory policy, to file regular compliance reports with the Commission, and “to take affirmative action, including the posting of notices setting forth the substantive rights of the public.” §24–34–605. Colorado law does not permit the Commission to assess money damages or fines. §§24–34–306(9), 24–34–605.


Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in August 2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop. App. 31. The complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been denied “full and equal service” at the bakery because of their sexual orientation, id., at 35, 48, and that it was Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings, id., at 43.

The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation. The investigator found that “on multiple occasions,” Phillips “turned away potential customers on the basis of their sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake for a same-sex wedding ceremony or reception” because his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential customers “were doing something illegal” at that time. Id., at 76. The investigation found that Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples on this basis. Id., at 72. The investigator also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted by Craig and Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment celebration because the shop “had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.” Id., at 73. Based on these findings, the Division found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA and referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission. Id., at 69.

The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal hearing, and it sent the case to a State ALJ. Finding no dispute as to material facts, the ALJ entertained cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in the couple’s favor. The ALJ first rejected Phillips’ argument that declining to make or create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins did not violate Colorado law. It was undisputed that the shop is subject to state public accommodations laws. And the ALJ determined that Phillips’ actions constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex-ual orientation, not simply opposition to same-sex marriage as Phillips contended. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–72a.

Phillips raised two constitutional claims before the ALJ. He first asserted that applying CADA in a way that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his First Amendment right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed. The ALJ rejected the contention that preparing a wedding cake is a form of protected speech and did not agree that creating Craig and Mullins’ cake would force Phillips to adhere to “an ideological point of view.” Id., at 75a. Applying CADA to the facts at hand, in the ALJ’s view, did not interfere with Phillips’ freedom of speech.

Phillips also contended that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex weddings would violate his right to the free exercise of religion, also protected by the First Amendment. Citing this Court’s precedent in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” and therefore that applying it to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 879; App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a–83a. The ALJ thus ruled against Phillips and the cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both constitutional claims.

The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full. Id., at 57a. The Commission ordered Phillips to “cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to heterosexual couples.” Ibid. It also ordered additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of CADA “and changes to any and all company policies to comply with . . . this Order.” Id., at 58a. The Commission additionally required Phillips to prepare “quarterly compliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “a statement describing the remedial actions taken.” Ibid.

Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission’s legal determinations and remedial order. The court rejected the argument that the “Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels” Phillips and the shop “to convey a celebratory message about same sex marriage.” Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P. 3d 272, 283 (2015). The court also rejected the argument that the Commission’s order violated the Free Exercise Clause. Relying on this Court’s precedent in Smith, supra, at 879, the court stated that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability” on the ground that following the law would interfere with religious practice or belief. 370 P. 3d, at 289. The court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the statute did not violate his free exercise rights. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Phillips sought review here, and this Court granted certiorari. 582 U. S. ___ (2017). He now renews his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.



Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), “[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27). Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968) (per curiam); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572 (1995) (“Provisions like these are well within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments”).

When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth. Yet if that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations.

It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public. And there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one could argue implicate the First Amendment. Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings, that would be a different matter and the State would have a strong case under this Court’s precedents that this would be a denial of goods and services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the general public and is subject to a neutrally applied and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 10.

Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is presented. He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line where the customers’ rights to goods and services became a demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs.

Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable given the background of legal principles and administration of the law in Colorado at that time. His decision and his actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in the year 2012. At that point, Colorado did not recognize the validity of gay marriages performed in its own State. See Colo. Const., Art. II, §31 (2012); 370 P. 3d, at 277. At the time of the events in question, this Court had not issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744 (2013), or Obergefell. Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in another State.

At the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive. Indeed, while enforcement proceedings against Phillips were ongoing, the Colorado Civil Rights Division itself endorsed this proposition in cases involving other bakers’ creation of cakes, concluding on at least three occasions that a baker acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24, 2015).

There were, to be sure, responses to these arguments that the State could make when it contended for a different result in seeking the enforcement of its generally applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the public. And any decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case.


The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.

That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips’ case. At several points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe “what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do business in the state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.” Id., at 30. Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s personal views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely.

On July 25, 2014, the Commission met again. This meeting, too, was conducted in public and on the record. On this occasion another commissioner made specific reference to the previous meeting’s discussion but said far more to disparage Phillips’ beliefs. The commissioner stated:

“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” Tr. 11–12.

To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.

The record shows no objection to these comments from other commissioners. And the later state-court ruling reviewing the Commission’s decision did not mention those comments, much less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the commissioners disavowed in the briefs filed in this Court. For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case. Members of the Court have disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 540–542 (1993); id., at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In this case, however, the remarks were made in a very different context—by an adjudicatory body deciding a particular case.

Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and prevailed before the Commission.

As noted above, on at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text. Each time, the Division found that the baker acted lawfully in refusing service. It made these determinations because, in the words of the Division, the requested cake included “wording and images [the baker] deemed derogatory,” Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4; featured “language and images [the baker] deemed hateful,” Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 4; or displayed a message the baker “deemed as discriminatory, Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4.

The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in these three cases contrasts with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ objection. The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the requested wedding cake would carry would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism. Additionally, the Division found no violation of CADA in the other cases in part because each bakery was willing to sell other products, including those depicting Christian themes, to the prospective customers. But the Commission dismissed Phillips’ willingness to sell “birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies,” App. 152, to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant. The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished. In short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not accord with its treatment of these other objections.

Before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Phillips protested that this disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the part of the Commission toward his beliefs. He argued that the Commission had treated the other bakers’ conscience-based objections as legitimate, but treated his as illegitimate—thus sitting in judgment of his religious beliefs themselves. The Court of Appeals addressed the disparity only in passing and relegated its complete analysis of the issue to a footnote. There, the court stated that “[t]his case is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division’s recent findings that [the other bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian patron on the basis of his creed” when they refused to create the requested cakes. 370 P. 3d, at 282, n. 8. In those cases, the court continued, there was no impermissible discrimination because “the Division found that the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the offensive nature of the requested message.” Ibid.

A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness. Just as “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943), it is not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall be offensive. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (opinion of Alito, J.) (slip op., at 22–23). The Colorado court’s attempt to account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The court’s footnote does not, therefore, answer the baker’s concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection.


For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint.

In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, supra, the Court made clear that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise Clause bars even “subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion. Id., at 534. Here, that means the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.” Id., at 547.

Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.” Id., at 540. In view of these factors the record here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating Phillips’ religious objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for it. Id., at 537. It hardly requires restating that government has no role in deciding or even suggesting whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience-based objection is legitimate or illegitimate. On these facts, the Court must draw the inference that Phillips’ religious objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.

While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the State’s interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these reasons, the order must be set aside.


The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated.

The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.

The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Comments - Make a comment
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Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:05:56   By: Anonymous
Trumps stolen seat on the bench is going to ruin our country

[Reply ]

    Re: Whack
    Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:29:52   By: Anonymous
    MAGA Trump

    [Reply ]

      Re: Whack
      Posted on: 2018-06-04 14:39:29   By: Anonymous

      [Reply ]

    Re: Whack
    Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:32:11   By: Anonymous
    This is a good decision for civil libertarians. Govt shouldn't be able to force actions against your own conscience. In that light this isn't really about religion or gay marriage but a basic freedoms issue.

    [Reply ]

      Re: Whack
      Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:45:22   By: Anonymous
      Right. And people operating public diners should not be forced to serve black people if doing so is against their racist beliefs, which are, of course, well supported in the Bible. Only straight white people are entitled to civil rights. MAGA.

      I'm kidding but sadly the SCOTUS was not. The US is heading into a giant toilet bowl.

      [Reply ]

        Re: Whack
        Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:00:55   By: Anonymous
        Wrong, you didn't read the case and are making yourself look foolish.

        The diner must serve black patrons but could not be forced to make a custom pancake platter with decorative chocolate syrup that says "white people are scum and need to be eliminated"

        [Reply ]

          Re: Whack
          Posted on: 2018-06-04 14:07:25   By: Anonymous
          I was responding to the comment, not the case.

          [Reply ]

            Re: Whack
            Posted on: 2018-06-04 15:01:39   By: Anonymous
            Your comment and the previous comment are all about the case buddy

            [Reply ]

              Re: Whack
              Posted on: 2018-06-05 08:01:03   By: Anonymous
              Since you're such a legal scholar, why don't you explain to all of us the definition of a FALSE over-opinionated, under-informed, knuckle-dragging, mouth-breathing, feces-throwing, blowhardy, asshat!

              [Reply ]

      Re: Whack
      Posted on: 2018-06-04 13:03:55   By: Anonymous
      Thank you! This would have set a precedent that people can be forced to make art or be charged with discrimination.

      Imagine an atheist baker is approached by the Westboro Baptist Church and is asked to bake a cake that says "All non believers will burn in hell" It is well within his rights to refuse to create the cake in the same way this baker was within his rights.

      The gay community is trying to make the issue about them without looking at the implications on the first amendment and legal system as a whole.

      [Reply ]

    Re: Whack
    Posted on: 2018-06-04 21:13:16   By: Anonymous
    maybe instead of a cake, they should have stuck with packing fudge.

    [Reply ]

      Re: Whack
      Posted on: 2018-06-05 08:03:42   By: Anonymous
      Yeah, dipsh*t, because gay women don't exist and the only way gay dudes fornicate is through anal penetration...super mature and classy method of expressing one's self!

      [Reply ]

No Subject
Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:32:48   By: Anonymous

[Reply ]

    Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:40:44   By: Anonymous
    I'll be damned if someone comes up to me and tells me I can't read my Bible either in the state of California! I believe in religious rights and the "right to refuse service" and that's to anyone without giving reason. If some gay guy came into my business and then he refused to leave, then I can call the cops on him too! If works both ways. This is America-love it or leave it!

    [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 09:48:25   By: Anonymous
      That's not my America. That's a perversion of America supported by cowards.

      [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 10:02:36   By: Anonymous
        It's my America and I don't want gay views rammed down my throat.

        [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-04 10:17:20   By: Anonymous

          [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:11:09   By: Anonymous
          It's also their America, too.

          [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-04 14:09:22   By: Anonymous
          A fear of something being rammed down your throat. I think we are starting to see your real insecurity.

          [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 11:57:10   By: Anonymous
          Edited By: thepinetree
        On: 2018-06-04 13:32:48

        [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:08:02   By: Anonymous
        Edited By: thepinetree
      On: 2018-06-04 13:33:18

      [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:57:33   By: Anonymous
      First off, you probably don't own a business.

      Second off, you sound as dumb as the lib who made the diner comment.

      You can't legally kick someone out of your hypothetical establishment for being gay. You can kick them out for loitering but not for simply being gay. The gay person wouldn't be able to force you to create an artistic display which promotes gay marriage, sex, or culture, but you still have to serve them the same non artistic goods you would serve any other customer.

      Good to know Calaveras has both ignorant liberals and conservatives...

      [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 13:05:11   By: Anonymous
        Actually I'm a business owner and you can kick anyone out of your business if it is privately owned.

        [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-04 15:09:04   By: Anonymous
          Sure can, but only for unprotected reasons if your business is open to the public (even if it's privately owned) and in California sexual orientation is a protected reason.

          But go ahead, next time a gay person comes into your fine establishment kick them out and do it with a note declaring that they were kicked out based on their sexual orientation. Tell me how that goes buddy

          [Reply ]

No Subject
Posted on: 2018-06-04 11:35:52   By: Anonymous
For your information the Bible doesn't condemn any race, black, yellow, brown, or white! If you can point me to verses that say differently, I would like to read them! Your race isn't your choice, being a homosexual is. Big difference! On the other hand, the Bible is very clear about perverted life styles, not my rules, but God's! Is God cruel for creating us this way, no, because in Genesis God created Man and Woman, and in relationships that include sex it is to be between a man and a woman period!

[Reply ]

    Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:09:03   By: Anonymous
    You're an idiot. Have you ever heard the story of David and Jonathan? They were gay and they are in the bible.

    [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:41:16   By: Anonymous
      Who the H is Jonathan?

      [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:47:09   By: Anonymous
      Read the Wikipedia article about David and Jonathan. It stated that there is no documentation of having any homosexual relationship. They were both kings and close friends. Many centuries later a group of gay Catholics concocted up this story about those guys being gay-an earlier form of fake news. I DO believe in what the old testament states. Certain groups or people think they can interpret it a certain way or should I say misinterpret. Thank you

      [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:55:55   By: Anonymous
        You are correct, you are one of the ones reading a bible that is not correct. And you need to study Theology. Genesis is a folk tale. Catholics believe God couldn't explain how we came to be (similar to explaining the birds and the bees to kids) so he "gave us this story." Do you know how to research at all? Go eat your pig...

        Also-Wikipedia is not TRUTH.

        [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-04 17:22:52   By: Anonymous
          Sorry but I don't agree with you and I insist that Wikipedia is a very reliable source. Are you a communist?

          [Reply ]

            Posted on: 2018-06-05 15:01:58   By: Anonymous
            I'm russian.

            [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:57:06   By: Anonymous
        Hope you're not a woman who believes in the OLD testament. Not good news for you if that's the case...

        [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 17:49:32   By: Anonymous
      Bathsheba would contest that :)

      [Reply ]

    Posted on: 2018-06-04 12:09:44   By: Anonymous
    And if you really want to follow the bible, do not eat PIG.

    [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 14:40:18   By: Anonymous

      [Reply ]

      Posted on: 2018-06-04 15:01:54   By: Anonymous
      OINK! :)

      [Reply ]

        Posted on: 2018-06-04 17:51:02   By: Anonymous
        Equally is for all people on the planet earth. Mr cake maker just does not like people who do not think like him. I would call him a hater. He doesn’t sound very religious to me.

        [Reply ]

          Posted on: 2018-06-06 00:06:18   By: Anonymous
          Who gives a shiite what it sounds like to you?

          [Reply ]

No Subject
Posted on: 2018-06-04 18:24:44   By: Anonymous
That's right, there is a difference between religion and Christianity, religion accompanies any thought that is considered sacred, big difference! I don't need the Catholic Church interpreting anything for me, they have been headed in the wrong direction for many year's, and Wikipedia has no credibility in interpreting what the Bible day's, you read the Bible for what it say's not what some human want's it to say! By the way, if you need a wedding cake go to a gay bakery, there are plenty of them, leave those that don't accept you beliefs alone, this action by this gay couple was ridiculous from the start!

[Reply ]

    Posted on: 2018-06-04 20:14:41   By: Anonymous
    Spoken like a straight white person who has never experienced discrimination in any form. Lucky you.

    [Reply ]

    Re: The measure you use to measure out will be measured out to you
    Posted on: 2018-06-04 22:13:28   By: Anonymous
    Hey meanie.
    The Catholic Church is who gave you The Bible in the first place, we are capable of interpreting our publications.

    Please keep in mind how much God loves and wants you to love others.
    Homosexuality is just one of mankind's sexual follies. Just as condemned as heterosexual adultery and fornication.
    Show mercy to others that God may show mercy to you.
    Pax Domini

    [Reply ]

      Re: Whack
      Posted on: 2018-06-05 07:47:24   By: Anonymous
      False equivalence is a logical fallacy in which two completely opposing arguments appear to be logically equivalent when in fact they are not.

      Sorry big guy, but this fallacy isn't present. Both examples I used were compelling someone to speak through art as a medium.

      Now look up ad hominem and look back at your sentence, then look into a mirror, then look into your wallet, and look at your ID.

      What do you see?

      Probably someone who doesn't understand the constitution, doesn't understand fallacies, and doesn't understand that 7-2 decision with concurring opinions from democrat appointed judges has nothing to do with Trump destroying the court system.

      Thanks, please come again.

      [Reply ]

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